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From the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) until the 
recent subprime financial crisis, the nation witnessed a remarkable growth 
in “going-private” acquisitions.1 As a percentage of total acquisitions, the 
purchase of publicly-held companies by privately-held companies jumped 
approximately twenty points.2 Scholars, with some notable exceptions,3 
point to the increased compliance costs of SOX as a significant cause of the 
change.4
                                                                                                                 
 *  Professor and J. Gilbert Reese Chair in Contract Law, The Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law. 
 1. Christian Leuz, Alexander J. Triantis & Tracy Y. Wang, Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes 
and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations 4 (European Corporate 
Governance Institute, Finance Working Paper No. 155/2007, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=592421 (documenting a spike in going private that is largely attributable 
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Charts, Leveraged Buyout Market and Going Private, MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS, Feb. 2008, at 93–95. By 2007, the high point in the growth of going private 
transactions, LBOs accounted for 30 percent by value of the total value of mergers and 
acquisitions. In 2001, it was only two percent. The growth from 2002 to 2007 was nothing short of 
an explosion. 
 2. COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMM. ON 
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (2006) [hereinafter CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM 
REPORT]. 
 3. Some believe that an increased availability of low cost credit, facilitating leveraged 
financing, is the primary cause of the going-private acquisitions. Allison Taylor & Ruth Yang, 
Evolution of the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan Markets, in HANDBOOK OF LOAN 
SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007). See also William 
Bratton, Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 
(2008). The cause is overstated. A company must show a profit to leverage successfully and at 
issue is why private equity buyouts offer the prospect of substantial profits to buyout funds. 
Adding leverage to existing profit flow does not seem to explain the attraction of going private, 
given the premiums paid in the acquisitions. Some target companies are, for example, showing no 
profits. Buyout funds must rationally believe that they can increase profits to justify cashing in on 
the new leveraged position. The belief that an increase in profits is available is the subject of the 
speculation on the role of SOX, for example. See also Andreas Beroutsos & Conor Kehoe, A 
Lesson in Governance from the Private Equity Firms, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/aboutus/mckinseynews/equity_firms.asp. (Authors are directors of 
McKinsey & Company) (“[P]ublic equity markets still face a real challenge from private equity     
. . . not from . . . its giddy use of financial leverage. Rather the challenge comes from private 
equity’s ability to align owners and managers more effectively.”). 
 4. E.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: the Irony of 
“Going Private”, 55 EMORY L. J. 141 (2005); Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes & Xue Wang, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ Going Private Decisions, 44 J. OF ACC. & ECON. 116 (2007). For 
an argument that SOX’s encouragement of going private acquisitions is a benefit to the public by 
reducing the public trading of securities by firms that are prone to financial fraud, see Ehud 
Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (Kauffman-RAND Inst. for Entrepreneurship Pub. Policy, 
Working Paper Series No. WR-300-2-EMKF, 2008), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/ 
berkeley_law_econ/fall2005/12/. 
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Scholars who believe SOX legislation and rules to be a primary cause 
of the popularity of going-private acquisitions point primarily to two SOX 
effects that are significant increases in regulation of publicly-traded 
companies: (1) increased audit requirements on internal controls, most 
notably Section 404, and (2) increased exposure of executives to liability 
from, among other provisions, certification requirements in Section 302 and 
906.5 There is, however, another feature of going-private acquisitions that 
merits study as a significantly contributing cause: the ability of controlling 
shareholders to structure the board of directors free of new constraints from 
SOX and from listing requirements of our national exchanges.6
Private buyout groups have used their freedom to construct tailored 
boards of directors to substantially alter the management structure and style 
of the public companies they take over.
 
7 Such changes deviate significantly 
from the “good corporate governance” rules many favor for publicly-traded 
companies.  Participants in the deals believe the management changes add 
significant value to the firm by increasing firm returns. In other words, 
going-private acquisitions could have an element of “governance arbitrage” 
about them.8
II. THE TYPICAL GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTION: 
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS DEFINED 
 If correct, that is, if the portfolio companies of private buyout 
funds are more successfully managed than those same companies when 
publicly traded, then we should question our traditional norms of “good 
corporate governance” for publicly traded companies. 
This essay discusses the non-scientific evidence of the management 
changes that follow going-private transactions and encourages empirical 
scholars to test the hypothesis that going-private transactions enable more 
efficient and effective board oversight and management. 
A going private transaction is defined as one in which a publicly-traded 
company reorganizes its capital structure to avoid the public reporting 
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. A publicly-held 
company must file annual and quarterly public reports under section 13(b) 
of the 1934 Act.9 A company is publicly-held if it is listed on a national 
securities exchange,10 has registered a public offering,11
                                                                                                                 
 5. E.g., Mary Calelgari & Howard Turetsky, Selling to Escape Compliance Costs, MERGERS 
& ACQUISITIONS, Sept. 1, 2006, at 54. 
 6. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 7. Id. 
 8. The term “governance arbitrage” is used in Beroutsos & Kehoe, supra note 3. 
 9. See also Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 13a, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2004)) and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 15d, 48 Stat. 881 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2004)). 
 10. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2004). 
 11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2 (2008). 
 or has more than 
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five hundred shareholders and ten million dollars in assets.12 A publicly-
held company escapes the periodic filing requirements if it reduces the 
number of its record shareholders of each of its registered securities to less 
than three hundred and delists all securities from any national exchange.13 
At that point, the company becomes privately-held and has the option of 
“going dark” (i.e., suspending its public filing of annual and quarterly 
reports).14 Most companies choose to stop filing the public reports.15 A few 
privately-held companies continue to file public reports because they either 
owe contractual obligations to debt holders, or think it is prudent to 
generate a record of reports that eases their return to the public capital 
markets in the future.16
There are several methods of going private. In single-firm 
reorganizations, a public company executes a reverse stock split, buying 
back its own stock (often in a self-tender offer), or engages a merger with a 
subsidiary to reduce the number of shareholders to less than three 
hundred.
 
17 In acquisitions by one company of another independent 
company, a privately-held company purchases a publicly-traded company. 
The privately-held company is referred to as a “strategic” buyer if it is 
another operating company (usually in the same industry).18
                                                                                                                 
 12. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §12(g)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. §78l (2004). 17 C.F.R. 
§240.12g-1 (2008). 
 13. Paul R. Bessette, Michael J. Biles, Christopher W. Ahart & Helen V. Heard, Considering 
Going Dark?, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Nov. 2006, at 2. 
The first step in going dark is delisting the company’s securities from their exchange. 
This action eliminates the registration requirements of Section 12(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Exchange Act Rule 12d2-2(d) permits a company to file an 
electronic application to withdraw a class of securities from listing on the exchange in 
accordance with the exchange’s rules. 
Id. Some authors use a Rule 13e-3 filing to signal a going private transaction. The Rule requires 
special disclosures in going private transactions. Rule 13e-3 filings only apply, however, to single 
firm transactions and to two-firm transactions in which a member of the target management team 
participates in the buyout. E.g., Carney, supra note 4. However, hostile buyouts or other buyouts 
in which the entire management team is excluded from participation in the buyout vehicle at the 
time of the acquisition are omitted. Buyouts with management participation, also known as 
management buyouts, create severe conflict of interest problems that have long troubled the 
courts. E.g., Dale Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating 
Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207 (1988). Rule 13e-3, requiring among other things, 
that the issue declare the transaction to be “fair,” is the SEC’s effort to control the conflict of 
interest problems. 
 14. Leuz, Triantis & Wang, supra note 1, at 1. 
 15. Id. at 7. 
 16. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Going Private But Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of 
Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going Private Decisions, 5 (Univ. Ga. Sch. of Law, Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 08–003, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088830. 
 17. Leuz, Triantis & Wang, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 18. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 7. 
 More 
frequently, the privately-held acquiring company is a newly-formed 
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subsidiary of a “financial” buyer, a pool of money gathered specifically to 
purchase this and similar companies.19
Acquisitions by financial buyers sparked the remarkable increase in 
going-private acquisitions in the early part of this decade.
 
20 These buyers 
are predominately private equity funds, also known as buyout funds.21 The 
buyout funds, which are typically structured as limited partnerships or 
limited liability companies, are run by well-known fund management firms 
in the form of buyout partnerships or companies.22 The management firms 
solicit capital from elite investors to avoid registration or filing 
requirements under a multitude of potential regulatory provisions.23 The 
trade-off for investors is that the buyout fund’s investors are locked-in for a 
period of time. The terms of capital investment in the buyout fund do not 
grant robust redemption rights that an investor can trigger quickly should 
she want out of the fund.24 Once a buyout fund is capitalized, the 
management firm finds a suitable publicly-traded target company and 
negotiates an acquisition. The fund creates a shell company as the 
acquisition vehicle and funds the purchase of the target company’s 
securities with a portion of the buyout fund’s cash capital and borrowings 
from other financial players.25 The shell company, typically in a two-stage 
acquisition (cash for control followed by a back-end, cash out merger), 
acquires a super-majority of the voting shares and thus control of the target 
company.26 The shareholders of the target company receive cash and the 
buyout fund, occasionally with a few other investors who buy a few 
minority shares, becomes the dominant, residual controlling shareholder.27 
The target company becomes a “portfolio” company of the buyout fund.28
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 8. 
 20. Id. at 3. 
 21. Id. at 8. 
 22. Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance of Private Equity Funds 7 (EFA 
Moscow Meetings, 2005) (unpublished Working Paper, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=473221). 
 23. The funds raise money in private placements (avoiding the Securities Act of 1933 
registration requirements), have less than five hundred investors (avoiding the reporting 
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934), are not mutual funds (are exempt from 
the Investment Company Act of 1940),  never take more than twenty-five percent of their 
investment capital from regulated pension funds (avoiding regulation by ERISA), and avoid any 
acts that would get them classified as a broker/dealer, a bank, an underwriter, a market-maker, or a 
commodity pool. The fund manager is careful to avoid regulation under the Investment Advisors’ 
Act of 1940. See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap 
for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 275–78 (2007). 
 24. See id. at 280–81. 
 25. Hence, the leverage in “leveraged buyout.” See Bartlett, supra note 16, at 9. 
 26. See Joshua M. Koenig, A Brief Roadmap to Going Private, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
505, 520 (2004). This often occurs after a first stage of stock acquisitions. 
 27. Id. at 533. 
 28. David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 
715, 722 (2008). 
 
Once a buyout fund has exhausted its capital by purchasing portfolio 
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companies, it is “fully invested” and the buyout fund’s management firm 
renews the cycle by creating new buyout funds for future acquisitions. 
A mature buyout fund does not intend to keep portfolio companies 
long-term.29 Rather, it seeks to sell all the acquired portfolio companies for 
a sizable profit and return cash proceeds to the buyout fund’s investors 
within five to seven years.30 To realize profits, the buyout fund resells the 
portfolio companies through public offerings or to other private buyers or 
strategic buyers in negotiated deals.31 Realizing a profit on resale is much 
more than mere asset speculation; the buyout company expects to enhance 
significantly the portfolio company’s value by installing new management 
in the portfolio company so as to correct flaws in the previous 
management’s decisions, strategy and practices. For example, new 
management may unlock the company’s value by “spinning off” or selling 
assets32
A fund specializing in buyouts is distinguishable from other important 
types of private-equity funds with similar structures. A fund’s type is 
defined by its choice of investments and holding or exit strategies.
 to make better use of company assets or capital, and streamlining or 
modernizing operations. 
33 
Venture capital funds take equity positions in start-up and emerging 
companies (primarily those developing technology), with a turnaround goal 
of five to ten years.34 These funds are usually more patient than buyout 
funds and only take full management control when the existing 
management stumbles badly.35 Hedge funds take highly-leveraged, partial-
equity positions to make pure asset speculation plays or to pressure the 
company to make immediate operational changes.36
                                                                                                                 
 29. Geoffrey Colvin & Ram Charan, Private Equity, Private Lives, FORTUNE, Nov. 27, 2006, 
at 190, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/27/ 
8394344/index.htm. 
 30. Per Stromberg, The New Demography of Private Equity, GLOBALIZATION OF 
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS 3–26 (World Economic Forum, Working Papers Vol. 1, 2008), 
available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/cgi/pe/Full_Report.pdf (finding almost 60% of private 
equity fund investments exit more than five years after the initial investment. In addition, the 
length of time portfolio companies remain under the control of private equity firms has increased 
in recent years. Less than 6% of buyout transactions end in bankruptcy or financial distress. This 
translates to a default rate of 1.2% per year, compared to an average default rate of 1.6% for U.S. 
corporate bond issuers and 4.7% for U.S. junk bond issuers). 
 31. Gary Barnett, Collateralized Fund Obligations: An Example of a Securitization of Private 
Equity Fund Investments (CFO), 1653 PLI/CORP 459, 463 (2008). 
 32. A spinoff grants assets to existing shareholders as an in specie dividend on their stock. 
Otherwise the management sells the assets to independent parities. 
 33. Christopher W. Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers 
with Profit Shares: What is it? Why is it Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071 (Summer 2008). 
 34. Illig, supra note 23, at 270–71. 
 35. Id. 
 36. E.g., Henny Sender, Hedge Funds Show Resilience in Thorny Times, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2008, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto012820081457435278. 
 The hedge fund’s 
investment turnaround goals are as short as one day and as long as two 
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years.37 Hedge funds do not often buy control of a firm and do not hold any 
single investment for long.38
Buyouts of a company are usually met with substantial hostility in the 
company’s locality. When a buyout fund installs new managers and 
relocates facilities elsewhere, the local citizenry and political leaders are not 
happy, particularly if the move is overseas.
 
39 Mike Huckabee, for example, 
successfully derailed Mitt Romney’s campaign for the Republican 
presidential nomination in 2008 with an oft-repeated line: “I believe most 
Americans want their next president to remind them of the guy who they 
work with, not the guy who laid them off.”40 Romney was one of the 
founders of Bain Capital, a well-known buyout firm.41
When managers of the target firm are involved in the buyout, they are 
charged with disloyalty to local interests and conflicts of interest with the 
target company’s shareholders.
 
42 If the buyout fund’s operating maneuvers 
fail and a healthy local company ends up in bankruptcy, local citizens are 
further incensed. Support for a buyout comes only when locals are 
convinced their local company is failing and a buyout fund could keep it 
alive, even if the company must be changed to survive. Leveraged buyout 
popularity rests exclusively with the quietly happy investors of the to-be-
purchased target companies, who usually receive a healthy 20 to 40 percent 
premium price for their shares,43 and investors in the buyout fund44 and its 
management firm45
III. PRIVATE EQUITY FUND RETURNS 
 that enjoy heady returns from the fund’s activities. 
Data on the returns of private equity funds is limited because neither the 
management firms, nor the funds or the investors in the funds are required 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS (2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Phil O’Connor, In Prestige or Jobs, or Both: “We’ll be taking a hit”, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Jul. 12, 2008, at A8. 
 40. Perry Bacon Jr. & Michael D. Shear, Hopefuls Clash in Debate as 1st Southern Primary 
Nears, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 11, 2008, at A9, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/10/AR2008011004007_pf.html. 
Chelsea Clinton, others have noted, took time off from a private equity fund to campaign for her 
mother. 
 41. Jenny Strasburg & Peter Lattman, Credit Crunch Rocks Bain, As Funds Fall Up to 50%, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008, at C1. 
 42. Brody Mullins & Kara Scanell, Politics and Economics: Buyout Firms Join Lobbying 
Efforts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at A4. 
 43. United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters, 
Private Equity: Recent Growth in Leveraged Buyouts Exposed Risks That Warrant Continued 
Attention, Sept. 2008, GAO-08-885 at 18. 
 44. Beroutsos & Kehoe, supra note 3. The top funds have routinely returned healthy premium 
over market indexes. 
 45. Buyout firms take twenty percent of the profits and management fees. Victor Fleischer, 
Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 
(2008). 
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to file public reports.46 Although the funds generate performance reports, 
the managers of the funds give the reports to investors under strict 
contractual duties of confidentiality.47 Investors, such as public university 
endowments that must publicly report on their investments, are not invited 
to invest. Moreover, there are no Securities and Exchange Commission 
rules to standardize the content of the reports.48 Financial economists 
studying the industry must instead rely on voluntary reporting in private 
equity trade publications by management firms.49 Private equity trade 
publications providing summaries of the industry data note that many funds 
do not report voluntarily and admit that the non-reporting firms are the most 
likely to be the worst performers.50 The data in the publications may, 
therefore, contain the effects of an over-reporting of desirable results in the 
summary.51 However, there may also be an under-reporting of superior 
results, if some firms do not want to attract regulatory and political attention 
to their successes.52
A well-known study on private equity returns, conducted by Steven N. 
Kaplan and Annette Schoar, analyzed the returns of private equity funds 
that were fully liquidated between 1980 and 2001.
 Moreover, and most importantly, much of the studies 
are dated and do not address the 2002-2007 period at issue in this essay. 
53 Kaplan and Schoar’s 
surprising conclusion was that those investors would have received better 
returns by investing in an index fund for the S&P 500.54 Their results were 
largely confirmed in a study that updates the data to 2003.55 Both studies 
used only liquidated funds to focus on cash payments and, therefore, omit 
projections of gains in still invested funds that may have been fully invested 
seven or more years before the end date of the studies, 1994 or 1996 to date. 
The approach, therefore, largely omits data from funds raised and invested 
in the 2002 to 2007 boom period.56
There is no doubt that the current economic credit crisis has adversely 
affected the private equity industry as well as the financial industry in 
general. This year’s growing financial crisis has dried up sources of capital 
 An academic study based solely on the 
period in issue here, from 2002 to 2007, is not known to this author. 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Rod Newing, Private Equity: Coming Out of the Shadows, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007. 
 47. Id. at 7. 
 48. Steven N. Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, 
and Capital Flows, 60 J. FIN. 1791, 1791 (2005) (“Private equity, as the name suggests, is largely 
exempt from public disclosure requirements”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Bratton, supra note 3, at 14. 
 51. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1794. 
 52. Newing, supra note 46; see also Bob Kennedy, Weathering a Storm, Beset by Attacks from 
Washington, Private Equity is on the Defensive, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Jul. 2007, at 61. 
 53. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1791. 
 54. Id. at 1821. 
 55. Phalippou & Gottschlag, supra note 22. 
 56. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 22; see also Bratton, supra note 3, at 3. 
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for buyout fund activities.57 With the loss of funding, the number of 
buyouts has declined precipitously.58 Several buyouts announced in 2007 
failed to close in 2008 as financial backers withdrew.59 Fund investors, 
often under pressure themselves to marshal cash, have exercised their 
withdrawal rights.60 A substantial number of newly-created funds have 
failed to raise sufficient capital to begin operations.61 It may take several 
years for the financing of buyouts to return. However, the slowdown in 
private equity funding in 2008 does not necessarily mean funds raised after 
2002 and before 2008 that are fully-invested, or that funds which have 
otherwise yet to liquidate, are not doing well. With the S&P 500 down 
substantially since early 2008,62 private equity funds may still be out-
performing the market.63
In any event, the trade publication StateStreet.com has published data 
on the five year period of interest in this essay that is in sharp disagreement 




 The StateStreet.com study is based 
on reported private equity fund returns from January 1997 to September 
2007 and is not limited to liquidated funds. A table of the results is 
contained below. 
Number of Funds Commitments ($B) Long-term IRR%   
Buyout:    619 $   813  15.70%   
Venture Capital:    600 $   204  12.42%   
Other:*    162 $   136  14.13%   
Total: 1,381 $1,153  15.03%   
S&P 500 Index:    N/A      N/A 10.51%**   
 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Heidi Moore, Deal Makers: Ripe for layoffs?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2008, at B1. 
 58. See Top Deals of 2008, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Feb. 2008. 
 59. See Dana Cimilluca, Cassell Bryan-Low & Jenny Strasburg, As Deals Crash, Investors 
Flee Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2008, at B1. 
 60. Peter Lattman and Keenan Skelly, Calstrs Will Invest Less In Latest Blackstone Fund; 
Move Hints at Worry Over Private Equity In Public Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2008, at C3. 
 61. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, As Hedge Funds Seek Cash, Market Suffers, Report Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/as-hedge-funds-
seek-cash-market-suffers-report-says/?scp=1&sq=hedge%20fund%20no%20investing&st=cse. 
 62. See Peter A. McKay, Dow Loses 45.10 as Comeback Fails to Erase All of Big Loss, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 5, 2008, at C1 (As of March, the Standard and Poor’s 500 was down 9.6%). 
 63. Cf. Sender, supra note 36. (It was banks that “blew up the world,” not hedge funds). 
 64. Id.; State Street Private Equity Index, http://www.statestreet.com/analytics/ 
is_179_private_edge.html (last visited May 20, 2008).  (Private Equity Index composition and 
dollar-weighted internal rate of return, net of management fees and carried interest, measured 
January 1, 1997 through September 30, 2007. * “Other” includes distressed investment, 
mezzanine and special situations funds; ** Compound annual growth rate 1957 through Sept. 30, 
2007). 
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From the table, one sees that the private equity funds easily beat the S&P 
500 Index over the sample period. 
As noted above, some critics will claim that only successful funds are 
represented in the sample because only successful firms will voluntarily 
report. The reports are marketing for new fund creation.65 Support for the 
StateStreet.com data comes from the tremendous success in capital-raising 
shown in buyout funds during the same period.66 Investors in record 
numbers and in record amounts flocked to the funds. This growth of 
investment capital was fueled by the funds’ high returns.67
Even if the Kaplan and Schoar finding is correct, that buyout funds in 
general do not provide above-market returns, the data on many funds 
remains encouraging. First, funds established early in a buyout-friendly 
economic cycle did very well and funds established late in the cycle did 
poorly.
 Kaplan and 
Schoar would suggest that the investors were misled perhaps, but from 
another perspective, perhaps they were not. Investors with skin in the game 
(cash at risk) believed that the funds offered above market returns. 
68 Therefore, studies on buyout returns must define and take into 
account these cyclical periods.69 Second, buyout funds that produced capital 
gains early in a cycle are the most likely to remain successful throughout 
the cycle.70 In other words, the best determinate of a buyout fund’s future 
success appears to be the nature of its past success. For example, top-tier 
private equity firms like The Blackstone Group, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & 
Co., and Bain Capital LLC, showed spectacular returns while second tier 
firms struggled to match the S&P 500.71 Investors who poured money into 
the successful funds were likely attracted by such returns. Selecting 
successful funds was, to a degree, predictable. Yet oddly enough, Kaplan 
and Schoar’s data, weighted by buyout fund size, did not reflect this 
finding. Third, Kaplan and Schoar’s study does not account for risk.72 Some 
studies claim that diversified going private funds show less market 
volatility than the S&P 500 and therefore, should show smaller returns.73
                                                                                                                 
 65. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1794. 
 66. Charts, supra note 1. 
 67. State Street, supra note 64. 
 68. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1819. 
 69. A study could catch the middle of a cycle. This is particularly a problem for going private 
studies because going private in large numbers is a very recent phenomenon. 
 70. Phalippou & Gottschlag, supra note 22, at 24; Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1813. 
 71. See, e.g., Maryland Tax Education Foundation, Press Release: Latest Research Concludes 
that Private Equity Funds Fail to Deliver Premium Rates, July 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.marylandtaxeducation.org/privateequityfund.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). 
 72. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1797. 
 73. See Joost Driessen, Tse-Chun Lin & Ludovic Phalippou, A New Method to Estimate Risk 
and Return of Non-Traded Assets From Aggregate Cash Flows: The Case of Private Equity 
Funds, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14144, June 2008), available at 
http://.ssrn.com/abstract=965917. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is that the Kaplan and Schoar data 
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was based on net returns reported by fund investors, not gross returns to the 
buyout fund.74
The difference between net returns to investors and gross returns to the 
funds is due substantially to the fees paid to the management firm.
 
75 
Management firms charge a number of fees that are deducted from the gross 
returns of the buyout fund.76 These fees are usually two percent of the 
capital committed to the fund per year, a twenty percent slice of the profits 
distributed (the “carried interest”),77 and transaction fees on the purchase 
and sale of portfolio companies.78
The observers claim that such a division of profits, with twenty percent 
or more going to the management firm that made a very small capital 
investment, is highly inequitable.
 A management firm that returns eight 
percent or more to its investors has done very well when the net return of 
eight or more is translated into gross returns. 
79 They necessarily discount as 
insignificant that the division creates the incentives for the management 
firm that generate the higher returns to the investors.80 Without those 
incentives, investors may very well receive less robust returns.81 
Nevertheless, the buyout fund’s higher returns have, of course, attracted the 
attention of Congress, which wants to tax these firms at higher rates than 
they currently pay.82
Therefore, Kaplan and Schoar’s data, based on net returns, supports a 
claim that the buyout funds generate substantial gross returns that exceed 
meaningful relevant market indexes.
 
83 The StateStreet.com data also 
supports the claim.84 Nevertheless, what is not entirely clear is the source of 
gross returns. The gross returns of private equity funds do not appear to be 
pure leverage plays. They are also related to the increased performance of 
portfolio companies under the new management hired by the buyout fund. 
Data on portfolio companies that are sold back to the public after a period 
of buyout fund management show gains in both market value and in 
accounting-based performance figures.85
                                                                                                                 
 74. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 48, at 1791. 
 75. Fleischer, supra note 45, at 8–9. 
 76. See id. 
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 78. Illig, supra note 23, at 287. 
 79. Fleischer, supra note 45, at 5–6. 
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 83. See Shourun Guo, Edith S. Hotchkiss & Weihong Song, Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?, 
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 84. State Street, supra note 64. 
 85. See generally Bratton, supra note 3. 
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position suggests that performance gains in the portfolio companies are 
entirely captured by the buyout fund management company and denied to 
the buyout fund investors. It is hard to believe that buyout fund investors 
are this gullible. In any event, the gross returns of buyout funds deserve 
careful attention. 
IV. MANAGEMENT CHANGES IN PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 
An important characteristic of buyout fund activity is their 
experimentation with and development of unique management styles.86 
Management restructuring seems to have aided significantly in creating 
value within newly-acquired portfolio companies.87
The reduction in the number of shareholders in a going private 
acquisition has inherent structural advantages. The reduction facilitates 
investor monitoring of target company managers and heightens 
accountability.
 It is this hypothesis that 
needs further statistical investigation. This essay contains a brief summary 
of antidotes that should encourage such a study. 
88 The reduction more closely aligns managers’ interests with 
the interests of the shareholder.89 And the reduction enables buyout funds to 
implement quickly, and without opposition, optional structural changes that 
provide substantial managerial advantages.90 The changes in management 
strategy include changes in management structure and compensation, 
changes in financial structure that affect management incentives, and 
changes in internal control procedures.91
First, management firms of buyout funds radically alter board structure 
and management compensation of portfolio companies.
 Each of these strategic changes is 
considered below. 
92 The buyout fund 
managers, for example, reduce the number of inside directors holding 
management positions in the portfolio company. The fund replaces 
management directors with directors appointed from within the 
management firm.93 The CEO of the newly-private portfolio company is 
rarely the Chairman of the Board and often not even on the Board of 
Directors.94 The CEO often attends board meetings but cannot vote.95
                                                                                                                 
 86. Allan Holt, co-head of US Buyout Group, The Carlyle Group, when asked about going 
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 89. Id. at 15. 
 90. Colvin & Charan, supra note 29, at 190. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Beroutsos & Kehoe, supra note 3, at 15. 
 93. Id. 
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Buyout management firms also reduce the number of outside directors. The 
few outside directors that are seated are portfolio industry experts, those 
affiliated with other portfolio industry participants or industry service 
companies.96 The new outside directors are not “independent” as that term 
is often used in modern corporate governance parlance. This is in conflict 
with modern “good corporate governance” standards that rely primarily on 
the placement of outside, independent directors on powerful, independent 
board sub-committees such as the audit, compensation, and nomination 
committees.97
For compensation, all board members in portfolio companies receive 
nominal amounts of cash, not options or stock, and they are expected to 
purchase equity positions in the company.
 
98 Inside directors, members of 
the buyout fund management group, profit from their position in the buyout 
fund. Outside directors profit from their positions in related industry 
positions. Executive pay in cash is heavily indexed to portfolio company-
specific performance goals based generally on revenue increases.99 
Compensatory options in portfolio stock take three to five years, or even 
longer, to vest.100 Unlike typical executive compensation agreements in 
public companies, there are few cash bonuses tied only to stock price and 
no golden parachutes or other change-of-control protections.101 The board 
and management have “skin in the game.” In comparison to executives in 
publicly-traded companies, the executives in buyout fund portfolio 
companies participate more heavily in upside gains and downside losses 
than do the executives in publicly-traded companies. Managers in publicly-
traded companies participate in the upside gains of investors but also do 
well even if investors do not (they do not participate in the investors 
downside losses).102 In publicly-traded companies, the board is 
compensated handsomely in cash, in options that vest quickly (from six 
months to three years), in cash and equity bonuses at year-end, and in 
golden parachute severance payment packages.103 Executive pay packages 
in publicly-traded companies are complex and opaque and much less 
dependent on an evaluation of company performance indexed to an industry 
standard than are pay packages in portfolio companies.104
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Second, buyout funds use more leverage by substantially increasing a 
portfolio company’s debt-to-equity ratio. The funds “make the equity 
sweat.” The increased leverage directly affects portfolio company 
management incentives. Debt-financing takes advantage of “cheap credit” 
and has come in for considerable criticism of late as portfolio companies 
struggle to maintain solvency in 2008’s tight credit market. But increased 
leverage also substantially contributes to the management incentive 
environment favored by buyout firms. High levels of leverage cause 
portfolio company management to develop an intense focus on company 
cash flow, squeezing working capital to maximize cash revenue.105 
Marginal operations are sold quickly and cash expenses are monitored 
carefully.106
Third, buyout management firms usually impose a new reporting 
system on portfolio company accountants and auditors. Most significantly, 
the outside auditor reports directly to the buyout fund, as well as to the 
portfolio company. This is an important and underappreciated change in 
oversight because it eliminates the classic problem of auditor conflicts-of-
interest in publicly-traded companies. In publicly-traded companies, 
auditors are hired by company management to whom they report and on 
whose practices they report. Auditors, concerned about management 
satisfaction with their services because management pays them, report for 
the benefit of investors whose money is entrusted to those managers.
 The use of leverage complements the changes in executive 
compensation packages for portfolio company executives by increasing the 
manager’s personal stake in the extreme upside gains and in the downside 
losses. 
107 The 
effect of the conflict is that bad information has a tendency to get 
overlooked or understated in the audit report.108
                                                                                                                 
 105. Colvin & Charan, supra note 29, at 190. 
 106. Id. 
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 108. CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 2, at 116. 
 In implementing SOX, 
Congress attempted to remedy the conflict of interest by empowering 
publicly-traded companies’ independent audit committees. The audit 
committee, under SOX, must consist of independent outside directors that 
not only hire auditors but that also create and oversee an internal financial 
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control system.109
V. THE TOTAL EFFECT 
 SOX also adds penalties for managers that compromise 
the integrity of any audit. Under SOX, however, the basic conflict remains: 
shareholders are passive consumers of audit reports paid for by those who 
are audited, managers. In portfolio companies, auditors that are hired by and 
report to the primary investor, the buyout fund, have stronger incentives to 
serve their client’s desire to have a dependable and accurate assessment of 
portfolio company affairs that includes both the good and the bad. Buyout 
firms demand accurate, truthful information about their portfolio companies 
to assess the competency of a company’s managers; auditors are compelled 
to tell even a harsh truth to the client-investors or suffer reputational 
damage as unreliable auditors. 
One of the surprises in the reports of portfolio management practices is 
that buyout funds usually impose SOX internal control requirements on 
portfolio companies in both auditing and disclosure systems. The internal 
control procedures of the publicly-traded companies do not change when 
the companies are taken private. It is only the auditors’ hiring and reporting 
that changes. It is difficult to determine whether buyout funds opt to use 
SOX internal controls because they are optimal management devices or 
because having the systems in place makes the portfolio company easier to 
resell in a public offering. 
By implementing structural changes to management, buyout funds seek 
to better align the interests of a company’s management with its 
investors.110 The buyout fund places and compensates executives so that 
they have a substantive financial interest in the company that mirrors the 
stake of the fund.111 And a buyout fund reforms a board of directors that 
will be more efficient in defining company strategy, and in supporting and 
monitoring the company’s executive officers.112
Executives in portfolio companies have remarked on the clarity of their 
mission and function.
 
113 For example, Thomas von Krannichfeldt, the CEO 
of AZ Electronic, once noted that “[t]he focus on cash flow is very intense   
. . . [m]ost employees who came from Clariant [AZ’s previous publicly-
traded owner] had never seen that. As a consequence, what they’d done 
with regard to controlling inventory or working capital wasn’t terribly good, 
and we could improve on that a lot.”114
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. at 115; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2) (2004). 
 110. See Guo, Hotchkiss & Song, supra note 83, at 4. 
 111. See Colvin & Charan, supra note 29. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1. 
 Public companies often disagree 
over what to measure, whether it is earnings per share, return on equity, 
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EBITDA, or return on net assets.115 In private equity portfolio companies, 
there is no confusion—cash flow is king.116 Jon Luther, the CEO of Dunkin 
Brands, explains: “There’s now a very different discipline in how you 
spend money. If it doesn’t grow the business, why would you do it?”117
Executives in private equity portfolio companies also have noted that 
they have more freedom to take risks and make difficult but necessary 
decisions.
 
118 According to Donald J. Gogel, the CEO of private equity firm 
Clayton Dubilier & Rice, Inc., portfolio company executives do not have a 
gun pointed at their heads all the time.119 There are no rigid internal 
hierarchies to prevent decisions and investors appreciate longer time 
horizons.120
CEOs of portfolio companies also spend more time on operations and 
less time talking to shareholders, analysts, and the media. Some estimate 
that CEOs in publicly-held companies spend only sixty percent of their time 
on operations and forty percent of their time on public relations.
 In publicly-traded companies, executives often feel the need to 
focus on quarterly results and are more risk averse to longer term gambles. 
121
Finally, portfolio company executives, chosen by management firms, 
are paid larger cash salaries.
 
Similarly, boards in publicly-held companies must deal with investor 
relations, usually through an Investor Relations Subcommittee, and worry 
about multiple shareholder ballot initiatives. There are no such diversions in 
a portfolio company. 
122 As a result, public companies have lost 
some of their brightest stars to private equity firms.123 The portfolio 
company pay packages are not subject to the harsh glare of the financial 
press and Gretchen Morgenson of the New York Times.124 For example, 
VNU, a Dutch global information and media company, paid General 
Electric’s (GE) superstar vice chairman David Calhoun $100 million to 
become VNU’s Chairman of the Executive Board and CEO.125
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 GE’s Paul 
68 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
Bossidy also left, and joined Cerberus.126 Procter & Gamble’s CEO, A.G. 
Lafley, complained in 2006 that he had “lost a half-dozen people” to buyout 
funds.127 A well-known executive recruiter during that time noted that 
“[t]op candidates are no longer waiting around to be recruited to a public 
company, instead they’re jumping to a private-equity firm and watching for 
the right opportunity to become a CEO. It wasn’t like this ten years ago.”128
The pay package comes with risk, however. A far larger share of 
executive pay is tied to the performance of the business.
 
129 Top executives 
are required to put a substantial amount of their own money into the 
buyout.130 The CEO of Dunkin Brands once noted: “I insisted that all 
officers invest personally. Management has a substantial amount of their 
personal money in this. It makes a huge difference in the 40 officers of the 
company when they show up for work . . . .  [T]hey have an ownership 
mentality rather than a corporate mentality.”131
The day-to-day operation of a portfolio company’s board of directors is 
also very different from the typical board of directors in a publicly-held 
company. The portfolio company’s board is smaller and consists only of 
representatives of the private equity fund and industry experts whose 
explicit job is to help management create and execute strategy.
 
132 Steven 
Denning, Chairman of the Board of General Atlantic, notes that “[t]he 
board is far more involved in assisting the company.”133 Jon Luther, the 
CEO of Dunkin’ Brands, praised the board’s connections and advice, 
saying: “Our three partners are able to connect us with people we otherwise 
couldn’t meet. For example, the Carlyle folks introduced us to one of their 
investors in Taiwan, and we soon had an agreement for 100 Dunkin’ 
Donuts stores there.”134 Pramod Bhasin, the CEO of GenPact, echoed 
Luther’s comments: “Their access to markets, to people, to the right 
headhunters, the right lawyers—that’s a huge help to companies that are 
newly independent, because without it, we’d have to swim for it 
ourselves.”135
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In sum, private equity firms have figured out how to attract and keep 
the world’s best managers, focus managers extraordinarily well, provide 
strong profit-based incentives, free managers from distractions, provide 
managers with expert outside help they can use, and maximize their 
productive time and output. 
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The only structural drawback is, perhaps, a potential conflict of interest 
inside the private equity firm that could affect portfolio company 
operations. Although managers of the buyout fund are agents of the fund’s 
investors, the managers of the fund may be tempted to promote their own 
interests as fund managers over the interests of the fund’s investors by 
raising new funds or keeping redemptions low in existing funds. An 
example might be the efforts of a buyout fund manager to conceal a 
portfolio company’s troubles so as to keep buyout fund valuations up. This 
conflict can translate into directors from the managers of the fund to the 
managers of the portfolio company acting in ways that are not in the best 
interests of the fund’s passive investors. The ability of the fund’s passive 
investors to monitor the fund managers’ conduct is the constraint that 
controls the conflict. Most buyout fund investors have substantial 
inspection rights written into their equity purchase agreements that enable 
them to monitor fund managers and fund portfolio companies’ 
performance.136
VI. PUBLIC REACTION 
 
The general media reaction to rapid growth of private equity buyouts in 
the five year period after 2002 has been largely negative. The new wealth of 
private equity management firms has been questioned, while the media has 
assumed some form of cheating has occurred.137 Wealth increases reflected 
in the buyout funds in this period were often regarded with suspicion and 
cynicism. A typical example occurred in a cover story in Newsweek in July 
of 2008, where co-authors Evan Thomas and Daniel Gross called private-
equity firms “Masters of the Universe” and “the true aristocrats,” noting 
that “even their secretaries, it seems, have English accents.”138 Attempting 
to indicate hubris, the authors said, “Private-equity partners are not just in it 
for the money (though the successful ones make tons of it), but for the 
power to reshape whole industries.”139 Imagine that! Of course, another 
word for reshape is “improve.”140
The media suspicion of private equity firms is possibly due to 
discomfort over such a naked exhibition of the operation of the shareholder 
primacy principle. In conflicts among corporate constituencies such as 
shareholders, managers, creditors, employees, local citizens, or even the 
environment, American corporate law directs boards of directors to favor 
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the interests of the residual claimants of the profit flow, the shareholders, 
under the shareholder primacy principle. Despite some ambiguity and 
slippage in case law and state statutes, the shareholder primacy principle, 
although tattered a bit, still defines the primary duty of corporate managers. 
In publicly-traded companies, there is more room for the ambiguities and 
openings to have an effect and for companies to consider interests other 
than simple profit motives.141
In portfolio companies run by private equity firms, there is no 
ambiguity or slippage in the operation of the shareholder primacy 
principle—the companies are run solely to make money for the buyout 
fund, which is the portfolio company’s controlling shareholder. It is an 
illustration of shareholder primacy on a large scale in its purest form acting 
on companies of intense interest to the public. It is no surprise that the 
operation of such companies unsettles those who wish for “softening” of the 
“rough edges” of capitalism.
 
142 Those “compassionate capitalists”143 and 
those who believe in democratic socialism surely are hardwired to despise 
the operation of buyout funds.144
VII. LESSONS FOR PUBLICLY-TRADED COMPANIES 
 
It is important to note that buyout funds and their portfolio companies 
are not the primary culprits in the current economic downturn. While both 
are suffering like everyone else, the companies that have failed first with 
compounding results were publicly-traded financial institutions. 
Publicly-held companies cannot mimic the portfolio companies of 
private equity buyout funds. Regulations prohibit some of the structural 
changes, and “Best Practice” corporate governance rules pushed by a well-
intentioned, concerned lobby may retard others.145 However, there are 
lessons from private equity practice that a public company may want to 
consider using. A publicly-held company could limit inside directors to 
representatives of large shareholders, although it is unlikely that companies 
will do so.146
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 Managers who run these companies will want to stay on the 
board. Similarly, it is possible to have auditors hired by and reporting to 
large investors in publicly-traded companies, but it is unlikely that 
companies will do so. Nevertheless, it is an intriguing proposal that a 
publicly-traded company’s audit subcommittee ought to be composed 
entirely of representatives of large shareholders. Such success in private 
equity practice supports the idea. 
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The use of outside directors to assist and advise rather than to oversee is 
obstructed by regulations and listing rules. At present, we are infatuated 
with the outside (i.e., non-executive), “independent” director as a 
monitoring force in publicly-held companies. A publicly-traded company, 
by law, cannot limit outside directors to “non-independent” industry 
experts.147 SOX legislation mandates the audit committee in a publicly-
traded company consist entirely of independent directors who do not 
“accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the 
[company]” and are not “an affiliated person of the [company] or any 
subsidiary thereof.”148 An affiliate is a person that controls the company, 
directly or indirectly and “control” means to possess “the power to direct or 
cause the direction of management and policies of a [company], whether 
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”149 
Aside from the obvious problem with the definition—that all outside 
directors seem to be affiliates under the “by contract, or otherwise” 
language—the rule also seems to prohibit executives in companies that 
provide professional services to the company, such as lawyers, consultants, 
and accountants, from serving as outside directors.150
Similarly, under stock exchange listing requirements, unless a listed 
company has a fifty percent majority owner, a majority of directors must be 
“independent” and the board must have entirely independent subcommittees 
on nominating and corporate governance, compensation, and audit.
 
151 A 
director is not “independent” if he has a “material relationship” with the 
company.152 A material relationship can “include commercial, industrial, 
banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable and familial 
relationships.”153
The two practices of private equity firms that public companies could 
match more easily, perhaps, are the compensation packages offered to 
executives and the greater use of leverage in financial structures to raise 
working capital. Again, neither is likely to be widely incorporated in 
publicly-traded company practice. Executive compensation practices in 
 Notably, the rule’s exception for a company with a 
majority owner recognizes that such a company may benefit from a board 
structure that replicates that of a portfolio company. In short, it would be 
very difficult for publicly-traded companies to replicate the practice of 
private equity portfolio companies of using affiliated industry experts as 
outside directors. 
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publicly-held companies suffer from considerable pressure to keep 
compensation obscure and complex so as to avoid public condemnation. 
The possibility of increased profit with high levels of debt-financing is not 
attractive to managers and other employees who have a vested interest in 
the company’s survival. The recent credit crisis may sour our taste for 
leverage for years to come. 
The tension between the governance recommendations for publicly-
traded companies and privately-held companies is well illustrated in the 
dust-up in the United Kingdom between competing “panel-of-expert” 
professional commissions, so common in the country. Legal professionals 
in the United Kingdom have long championed the use of industry “good 
corporate governance” recommendations for its business. In 2003, an 
industry working group released the Higgs Report on Corporate 
Governance, which advocated the use of independent outside directors on 
multiple board subcommittees.154 The explosion of private equity buyout 
funds led to the formation of a second commission focusing on good 
governance rules for private equity practice. In the Walker Report of 2007 
on Private Equity, the commission came to the conclusion that the Higgs 
Report recommendations would not work for private equity firms and 
recommended, instead, the limited use of “non-independent” outside 
consultants as board members—in essence applauding current practice.155 
The Walker Report was excoriated by Derek Higgs, the author of the 2003 
report,156 and others who wanted the governance standards for publicly-held 
companies to be applied to privately-held companies.157 Walker’s response 
was that “it would be ‘dotty’ . . . to insist that private equity firms appoint 
independent directors to the boards of portfolio companies they 
acquired.”158
                                                                                                                 
 154. Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors, Jan. 2003, 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23012.pdf. See also John Carver, The Promise of Governance 
Theory: Beyond Codes and Best Practices, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 1030, 1037, 
(2007); Peter Montagnon, The Governance Challenge for Investors, 12 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN 
INT’L REV., 180, 183, (2004). 
 155. SIR DAVID WALKER, GUIDELINES FOR DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY IN PRIVATE 
EQUITY (2007), http://www.altassets.com/pdfs/wwg_report_final.pdf.  See also Jeffrey Pellin, 
Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity Consultation, WALKER WORKING GROUP (2007). 
 156. Higgs, supra note 154. 
 157. Ruth Sutherland, Has Sir David Tamed the Tycoons?, THE OBSERVER, Nov. 25, 2007, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/nov/25/privateequity.businessandmedia. 
 158. Martin Arnold, Buy-out Industry Urged to Buy into External Directors, FIN. TIMES, July 
18, 2007, at 2. 
 In sum, the pressure from the “good governance community” 
is the reverse of what it perhaps ought to be: asking successfully privately-
held companies to adopt the management practices of their less successful 
publicly-traded brethren. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Since publicly-traded companies are unlikely to be free to match the 
management advantages of private equity funds over their portfolio 
companies, “governance arbitrage” may always remain an explanatory 
incentive for successful going private transactions. Market participants 
believe the value added by improved governance practices is substantial and 
are eager to invest their own cash on their assessment if other economic 
conditions are conducive to an acquisition. Financial economists have yet to 
assess whether they are correct, however. 
